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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
POLYGLYCOAT CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
No. 15779 
STEVEN HOLCOMB, dba 
STEVE HOLCOMB DISTRIBUTING, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action brought by the plaintiff to 
collect on an account for goods sold; and a counterclaim 
by the defendant-appellant for damages resulting from the 
breach of a distributorship contract. 
DISPOSITION BELOW 
Immediately prior to the commencement of the trial, 
the trial court granted plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment 
on its claim which was unopposed by the defendant-appellant. 
Following a two and one-half day trial on the defendant's 
Counterclaim to a jury, the Hon. Bryant H. Croft, one of 
the judges of the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake 
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County, granted a judgment of directed verdict in favor 
of plaintiff-respondent on ~efendant-appellant's Counter-
claim for breach of a distributorship contract. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant-appellant seeks a reversal of the trial 
court's judgment of directed verdict, and an order remanding 
the case for a trial on defendant-appellant's claim for 
breach of contract. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
In the spring of 1975 as a distributor of various 
automobile products, defendant-appellan't was approached by 
the plaintiff-respondent and was offered an exclusive 
distributorship for Polyglycoat products (R.P. 496). 
Defendant-appellant accepted the offer, and the parties 
came to an oral agreement that defendant-appellant would 
distribute Polyglycoat products in the states of Utah, 
Colorado, New Mexico, Nevada and Arizona (R.P. 497). The 
products to be distributed were Polyglycoat, a sealer-wax 
type substance that was applied to automobiles to allegedly 
enhance and protect the paint finish (R.P. 553). In 
addition, Polyglycoat carried a maintenance product that 
was used on the car to maintain the original finish follow-
ing the initial treatment with the sealant-wax product. 
2 
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Subsequent to his being made a distributor, defendant-
appellant hired salesmen and established sub-distributors 
to market the product and establish permanent customers 
(R.P. 565,566,587). Following efforts by the defendant-
appellant as a distributor Polyglycoat began to gain in 
popularity and defendant-appellant desired that the oral 
distributorship agieementbe incorporated into a writing. 
On February 7, 1976, the parties entered into a written 
agreement setting out minimum purchase requirements, 
territory, and duration (Exhibit 3-D). The contract was 
silent as to payment terms and standards of performance 
(Exhibit 3-D). 
In the course of business dealings between the 
parties, defendant-appellant would order Polyglycoat on a 
per case basis, with a case consisting of two quart cans 
of Polyglycoat sealant and twelve maintenance kits (one 
kit per car)(R.P. 497). The case was designed to service 
twelve automobiles with an initial treatment of product 
from the quart cans. ~aintenance kits were used for their 
care in the future. In addition, a card warranting the 
life of the finish was included (Exhibit 8-D). Plaintiff-
respondent found that this packaging design had to be 
changed as the two quart cans of sealant proved to be too 
much product for twelve cars (R.P. 525). As such, each 
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distributor was told to remove a quart can from each case 
(R.P. 525, Exhibit 6-B). Still, this did not remedy the 
excess, and the distributors were told to remove the other 
quart can, replacing it with a small tube (R.P. 526). 
After following plaintiff-respondent's directions and 
removing the cans from the cases, defendant-appellant was 
faced with a surplus of Polyglycoat product for which he 
had already been billed (R.P 597, Exhibit 1-D). As the 
sole distributor of Polyglycoat in the area of Utah, 
Colorado, New Mexico, Nevada and Arizona, defendant-appellant 
decided to utilize the excess product by marketing it 
through a service center-detail shop, and through the 
customers that he had already established (R.P. 753). To 
facilitate such, defendant-appellant had bottles manufactured 
in which he was going to market the excess product (Exhibit 
18-P). In addition, the defendant-appellant had warranty 
cards printed (Exhibit 11-P). The warranty cards were 
needed for two reasons: (1) Defendant-appellant was short 
of warranty cards for the maintenance kits as dealers would 
fill them out under the name of a prospective new car buyer, ani 
if the sale subsequently fell through the card was wasted, 
leaving the dealer with one card short for every such 
occurrence. Defendant-appellant had requested replacements 
from the plaintiff-respondent, to no avail (R.P. 592, 593); 
4 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
(2) As the distributor and the representative of Polyglycoat, 
defendant-appellant wanted to warrant any product sold, in-
cluding the excess product. At the time the warranty cards 
were completed defendant-appellant had spoken with his 
accountant who advised against their use (R.P. 633). After 
reflection and outside advice, defendant-appellant abandoned 
any plan to use the bottles, and never marketed any product 
in them as he realized for the first time to do so might 
be unethical or unfair (R.P. 591, 592, 753). Prior to 
abandoning the above plan, defendant-appellant had never 
received any written instruction on how to dispose of the 
excess Polyglycoat product, and as the distributor for 
Utah, Colorado, New Mexico, Nevada and Arizona, he felt 
his responsibility and authority was to sell and distribute 
Polyglycoat products in a manner using his best judgment 
(R.P. 530). 
Defendant-appellant continued to perform under 
the distributorship contract, and had ordered the required 
product for the first quarter of the agreement term, which 
plaintiff-respondent refused to ship (Exhibit 9-D). 
Plaintiff-respondent established another 
distributor who has utilized many of the same customers 
and sub-distributors that the defendant-appellant established 
(R.P. 675). 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT'S 
MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT WHERE THERE WAS SUBSTAN-
TIAL EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT'S GOOD FAITH 
In the case below, the trial court granted a 
directed verdict against defendant-appellant on the basis 
that defendant-appellant failed to exercise good faith in 
entering into and performing the contract of February 7, 
1976. Since good faith is a subjective test and because 
there was abundant evidence that defendant-appellant acted 
in good faith, the trial court erred in directing the 
verdict. 
The issue of good faith under the UCC is a sub-
jective test. In Balone v. Cadillac Automobile Co., 113 
N.H. 108, 303 A.2d 194 (1973) the Supreme Court of New 
Hampshire discussed the issue of good faith by applying 
it to the circumstances of a purchaser. 
By its terms this is a subjective standard 
of good faith, that is whether the particu-
lar purchaser believed he was in good faith, 
not whether anyone else would have held the 
same belief. The test is what the parti-
cular ~erson did or thought in the given 
situation and whether or not he was honest 
in what he did. (emphasis added) 
See Farmers Cooperative Elevator, Inc. v. State Bank, 236 
N.W.2d 674 (Iowa 1975); Tumber v. Automation Design & Mf8. 
Corp., 130 N.J. Super. 5, 324 A.2d 602 (1974); Eldon's 
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Super Fresh Stores, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner 
& Smith, Inc., 296 Minn. 130, 207 N.W.2d 282 (1973). 
In determining the issue of good faith, there-
fore, it is critical to know whether defendant-appellant was 
honest in what he did. There was credible evidence at 
trial which if believed, would have demonstrated that defen-
dant-appellant acted in good faith. The evidence showed that 
although defendant-appellant had a large supply of excess 
product that had to be disposed of, he did not have enough 
warranties for the product. Defendant-appellant had 
requested additional warranties from plaintiff-respondent, 
but they were never sent. In deciding what to do with 
the excess product and lack of warranties, defendant-
appellant considered selling the excess product in his own 
'~~
bott~es and printing the wa:~antie~_him~ing this 
~- ---------~-----------
he would be able to get rid of his excess product and also 
have warranties for those bottles and also for others. 
In pursuit of this plan, defendant-appellant had 
some bottles manufactured and some warranties printed. 
However, before the plan was ever put into effect, defendant-
appellant spoke with his accountant, who advised him that 
the plan would possibly not be a good business practice. 
After receiving this advice, and deliberately considering 
the plan, defendant-appellant decided not to pursue the 
7 
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idea. At that point nothing more was done. 
At the time the idea was conceived, defendant-
appellant honestly believed that he would not be sacrific-
ing his performance under the contract. When he made a 
more careful consideration and had a feeling that the plan 
was not ethically proper, he immediately abandoned it. From 
this evidence presented at trial it was apparent that what 
defendant-appellant thought and did was honest and therefore 
in good faith. 
In addition to being a subjective matter, the 
issue of good faith is particularly a jury issue. In Walter 
E. Heller & Co., Inc. v. Convalescent Home, 49 Ill.App. 3d 
213, 265 N.E.2d 1285 (1977) the Illinois Appellate Court 
stated that 
the test of good faith is a subjective 
standard to be determined by the facts 
of each case. Consequently, the defense 
of lack of good faith by plaintiff 
presents a factual issue which cannot be 
resolved purely as a matter of law . . . 
The Court of Appeals of Kentucky in Fort Knox 
National Bank v. Gustafson, 385 S.W.2d 196 (1964), construed 
the UCC provision on good faith as "requiring the submission 
to the jury of the issue of good faith unless the evidence 
relating to it is no more than a scintilla, or lacks 
probative value having fitness to induce conviction in the 
minds of reasonable men." 
8 
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As previously discussed, there was considerable 
evidence presented at trial, far more than a scintilla, on 
the issue of defendant-appellant's good faith. Because 
there was contradictory evidence on the issue of good faith 
and since good faith is a jury issue, the trial court erred 
in not allowing the good faith issue to go to the jury. 
From the evidence presented at trial it is clear 
that the trial court did the very opposite of what this 
Court declared in Finlayson v. Brady, 121 Utah 204, 240 
P.2d 491 (1952). 
In directing a verdict, this court has 
held, as the authorities generally hold, 
that the evidence is to be examined in 
a light most favorable to the party 
against whom the verdict is intended, and 
that it is not the province of the court 
to weigh or determine the preponderance 
of the evidence. 
Also, Anderso~ v. Gribble, 30Utah 2d 68, 513 P.2d 432 (1973); 
Smith v. Thornton, 23 Utah 2d 110, 485 P.2d 870 (1969). 
Had the trial court viewed the evidence as in-
structed by this Court in Brady, a directed verdict would 
never have been granted against defendant-appellant. By 
granting a directed verdict against defendant-appellant, 
the trial court violated this Court's declared policy 
"to zealously protect the right of trial by jury and not to 
take issues from them and rule as a matter of law except 
9 
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in clear cases." See Webb v. Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp., 
9 Utah 2d 275,342 P.2d 1094 (1959). 
This was definitely not a clear case. The 
evidence was such that reasonable men could and would have 
arrived at different conclusions. See Rhiness v. Dansie, 
24 Utah 2d 375,472 P.2d 428 (1970). The directed verdict 
must therefore be reversed. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT'S 
PROCEDURAL REQUESTS WHICH PREJUDICED THE DEFENDANT-
APPELLANT IN PREPARING HIS CASE 
On March 15, 1977, plaintiff-respondent filed its 
Reply to Counterclaim (R.P. 19). In that Reply, plaintiff-
respondent admitted entering into a contract with defendant-
appellant on February 7, 1976. As a defense, plaintiff-
respondent alleged that defendant-appellant had breached 
the contract and started an illicit business in competition 
with plaintiff-respondent. 
Nearly a year later on January 30, 1978, and after 
all discovery had been completed and a pre-trial conference 
had been held, plaintiff-respondent filed its Motion to 
Amend Reply to Counterclaim (R.P. 71) and also its Amended 
Reply to Counterclaim (R.P. 68-69). The Motion was schedul-
ed to be heard on February 6, 1978, the morning of trial. 
In the Amended Reply to Counterclaim plaintiff-respondent 
denied entering into the contract. It also raised a new 
10 
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defense of fraud. The trial court allowed the plaintiff-
respondent to amend its reply, after hearing the Motion in 
chambers on February 6, 1978. 
Such a motion should have been denied because of 
the prejudice it created against the defendant-appellant. 
To allow plaintiff-respondent to deny entering into the 
contract and to allow it to raise an entirely new defense 
on the day of trial was unconscionable. It forced defendant-
appellant to enter the trial with no knowledge of what was 
going to be presented by plaintiff-respondent. The grant-
ing of plaintiff-respondent's Motion conflicted with one 
of the major purposes of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
that of preventing surprise at trial. 
In dealing with a similar problem, the Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals in Wirtz v. Savannah Bank & Trust 
Co., 362 F.2d 857 (1966), denied such an amendment. In 
that case the court stated: 
This motion on appeal in the guise of a 
Rule lS(b) amendment seeks not only to 
nullify an earlier admission but also to 
assert a new defense not previously 
pleaded. This cannot be done. 
So also below, the trial court should not have allowed the 
Amended Reply. It erred by doing so. 
The trial court erred further, assuming that it 
was proper to allow plaintiff-respondent to amend its Reply. 
11 
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If it was proper to allow the Amended Reply, its form was 
improper. As was stated in Gromacki v. Armour & Co., 76 
F.Supp. 752 (W.D. Mo. 1948), "the essential elements of 
fraud must be alleged and strictly proved." Also Elster 
v. Alexander, 75 F.R.D. 458 (N.D. Ga. 1977); In re National 
Student Marketing Litigation, 413 F.Supp. 1156 (D.C. 1976). 
The nine essential elements necessary to prove 
fraud cited by this Court in Cheever v. Schrarrrrn, No. 15147 
(March 16, 1978) were never alleged or proven by plaintiff-
respondent. Hence, in addition to improperly allowing the 
Amended Reply, the trial court also allowed a pleading 
averring fraud which failed to state the circumstances 
constituting fraud with particularity as required by Rule 
9(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and the above cited 
cases. 
Much of the evidence at trial dealt with the 
alleged bad faith on the part of defendant-appellant. In 
neither the Reply to Counterclaim or the Amended Reply to 
Counterclaim did plaintiff-respondent plead the affirmative 
defense of good faith. In Bunge Corp. v. Recker, 519 F.2d 
449 (1974), the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals stated that 
lack of good faith was akin to fraud and fell under Rule 
8(c) which required it to be plead as an affirmative defense. 
Since plaintiff-respondent failed to plead the 
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issue of lack of good faith as an affirmative defense, it 
should have been barred from using that defense inasmuch as 
defendant-appellant was never put on notice of such a 
defense. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that, inasmuch as 
there was substantial evidence of defendant-appellant's 
good faith in the trial below and since the granting of 
plaintiff-respondent's procedural requests on the day of 
trial resulted in procedural unfairness to defendant-appellant, 
the trial court's decision be reversed and the case remanded 
for a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
_, A)_,_!4( 2, 71;~ ---
Wendell E. Bennett 
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